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• Canada’s lengthy experience with a
ﬂexible exchange rate regime has had an
important impact on the development of
macroeconomic theory and policy in open
economies.
• This article focuses on the 1950–62
ﬂoating-rate period because the ﬂexible
exchange rate, combined with a high degree
of capital mobility between Canada and
the United States, provided an unpre-
cedented experiment for macroeconomic
policy.
• The Canadian experience over this period
highlighted the two key beneﬁts of a
ﬂoating rate: smoother and less costly
adjustment to external shocks and the
opportunity to operate an independent
monetary policy to achieve low and stable
inﬂation.
• Canada’s experience also led to the
development of the Mundell-Fleming
model and a better understanding of the
impact of monetary and ﬁscal policies in
open economies.
anada’sexperiencewithaﬂexibleexchange
rate regime in the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries is remarkable not only for
sheer length, but also for its impact on macro-
economic theory and policy in open economies.1
Although Canada had a ﬂexible exchange rate regime
over the periods 1933–39 and 1950–62, and has main-
tained one since 1970, this article focuses on the
important lessons learned from the intermediate
period in the 1950s because economic historians con-
sider it the most influential.2 The purpose of the article
is to examine the two most notable lessons from the
Canadian experience. First, it highlighted the two
key, and still important, benefits of a flexible exchange
rate regime: namely, its ability to insulate the domestic
economy from external shocks by facilitating a smoother
and thus less costly macroeconomic adjustment, and
the fact that it permits the operation of an independent
national monetary policy.3 Second, Canada’s experi-
ence led to a better understanding of the impact of
monetary and fiscal policies in an open economy
with a high degree of capital mobility. Moreover, the
Canadian experience demonstrated that because a
ﬂexible exchange rate is an endogenous market-deter-
mined variable, its effectiveness as a macroeconomic
shock absorber depends on its being supported by a
coherent monetary and fiscal policy framework
1. This article is largely based on two recent Bank of Canada research papers:
Bordo, Dib, and Schembri (2007) and Bordo, Gomes, and Schembri (2008).
2.  Powell (2005) provides an insightful overview of the history of the
Canadian dollar.
3.  In an environment of no capital controls (i.e., capital mobility) countries
cannot simultaneously maintain an independent monetary policy and a ﬁxed
exchange rate. Thus, to operate an independent monetary policy, a country
must adopt a ﬂexible exchange rate.
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aimed at achieving low inflation and stable output
growth.4
Canada’s ﬂoating-rate experience contributed to the
postwar debate on exchange rate regimes by providing
evidence to support the case for a flexible rate as a
viable alternative to the Bretton Woods system of
pegged exchange rates.  In 1950, Canada was the ﬁrst
major industrialized country to leave the Bretton
Woods system to adopt a ﬂoating exchange rate. The
consensus is that Canada’s flexible rate performed
well over the next 12 years.5 In particular, the ﬂexible
rate traded in an orderly manner and responded to
shocks to underlying fundamentals largely as theory
would predict; it did not fluctuate widely or erratically as
a result of speculative excesses, as some had predicted.
This largely beneficial experience confirmed the pre-
dictions of James Meade (1951) and Milton Friedman
(1953; see also Friedman, Gordon, and Mackintosh
1948), who were early supporters of ﬂexible exchange
rates. The Canadian experience subsequently gener-
ated much interest and numerous studies.6 This
research, in turn, helped to motivate the ongoing
debate on exchange rate regimes and foreshadowed
the eventual collapse of the Bretton Woods system in
the early 1970s, when, once again, Canada was the first
of the major countries to exit.
The ﬂexible exchange rate traded in
an orderly manner and did not
ﬂuctuate widely, as some had
predicted.
Canada’s flexible exchange rate experience in the
1950s demonstrated the two principal benefits of a
ﬂexible exchange rate regime. First, the ﬂoating rate
responded to external shocks, such as shifts in export
demand or commodity-price (terms-of-trade) move-
ments, to facilitate real exchange rate adjustment
which, in turn, mitigated the impact of these shocks
on domestic economic activity and on the aggregate
4.  See Laidler (1999) for a discussion of the need for a coherent monetary
order under a ﬂexible exchange rate regime.
5.  For example, Friedman and Roosa (1967, 122) wrote “Canada went off
ﬂoating exchange rates . . . because they were working so well, and their
internal monetary policy was so bad.” See also Yeager (1976).
6.  Yeager (1976)  provides an excellent critical review of this literature.
price level. Its ability to respond to these external shocks
over this period was sometimes limited, however, by
monetary policy that was insufficiently countercyclical.
Second, the flexible exchange rate permitted an
independent monetary policy that was reasonably
successful in achieving low and stable inflation. As
noted in Friedman and Roosa (1967, 122), however,
“ﬂoating rates are not a guarantee of sensible internal
monetary policy.” In the ﬁrst half of the ﬂoating-rate
period (1951–56), inﬂation and unemployment rates
were relatively low. In the second half of the period
(1957–62),however,monetarypolicywasnotsufficiently
countercyclical, which led to higher unemployment
rates, slower growth, and episodes of monetary and
fiscal policy conflicts. This chain of events played a
role in the forced resignation of the Governor of the
Bank of Canada, James Coyne, and eventually led to
the collapse of the flexible-rate regime as Canada
temporarily returned to the Bretton Woods ﬁxed-rate
system.
The same events were the inspiration for new approaches
to understanding and modelling monetary and ﬁscal
policies and their roles in macroeconomic stabilization
in an open economy. In particular, Canada’s ﬂexible
exchange rate and high degree of capital mobility with
the United States provided an unprecedented experi-
ment for macroeconomic policy. The ramiﬁcations of
these two conditions for monetary and fiscal policy
were not fully appreciated until the work of Canadian
Robert Mundell and J. Marcus Fleming. Indeed, the
development of the Mundell-Fleming model is widely
seen as the path-breaking innovation in the develop-
ment of modern open-economy macroeconomics, and
for his contribution, Mundell received the Nobel Prize
in 1999.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) deplored
Canada’s decision to ﬂoat its dollar in 1950 because its
ofﬁcials viewed Canada’s departure as a serious threat
to the newly founded Bretton Woods system. The suc-
cess of Canada’s ﬂoat not only molliﬁed their criticism
and their calls for a quick return to the pegged-rate
system, it also promoted research at the IMF on flexible
exchange rates. Indeed, Fleming’s research was con-
ducted while he was an IMF ofﬁcial, and Mundell did
some of his work on the subject while visiting the IMF
in the early 1960s.
The article is divided into three sections: the historical
narrative; an analysis of the behaviour of the ﬂexible
rate over the period 1950–62; and a brief discussion of
the impact of the Canadian experience on economic
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Historical Narrative
Although this narrative is organized chronologically,
the two important sets of lessons from Canada’s expe-
rience—on the potential beneﬁts of a ﬂexible exchange
rate for an open economy like Canada’s and the conduct
of macroeconomic policies under a ﬂexible exchange
rate and a high degree of capital mobility—are identi-
ﬁed and discussed throughout.
Prelude to ﬂoating
Canada played an important role in the founding of
the IMF and the Bretton Woods system in July 1944.
Future Bank of Canada Governor Louis Rasminsky
provided critical leadership in the negotiations by
serving as a mediator between the American and
British teams, led by Harry Dexter White and John
Maynard Keynes, respectively (Muirhead 1999). The
principal goal of the Bretton Woods pegged, but
adjustable, exchange rate system was to preserve the
stability of the international monetary system by
preventing the beggar-thy-neighbour exchange rate
policies and the resulting macroeconomic instability
of the interwar period.
From 1945 to 1950, Canada tried to maintain its com-
mitment to a pegged exchange rate under the Bretton
Woodssystem,butwasforcedbyswingsincommodity
prices, investment ﬂows, and reserve levels to adjust
its pegged exchange rate in July 1946 (from US$0.909
to parity) and again in September 1949 (from parity to
US$0.909) in order to preserve domestic macroeco-
nomic stability (see Chart 1).7 Despite the continued
use of exchange controls, however, the pegged rates
could not be easily maintained in either instance
because sharp movements in the balance of payments
and reserve levels (Chart 2) would have forced domestic
prices and wages to adjust to the external imbalances
via changes in the domestic money supply. Moreover,
this sequence of relatively rapid up-and-down
adjustments in the pegged exchange rate created the
expectation that the authorities would respond with
another re-pegging when economic circumstances
changed. Thus, if speculators correctly anticipated a
pegged-rate revaluation (or devaluation), they could
earn large returns by acquiring domestic (or foreign)
currency assets beforehand. Consequently, speculation
could become self-fulﬁlling, since the expectation of
an adjustment would fuel capital ﬂows and increase
the likelihood of re-pegging. Indeed, this self-fulﬁlling
7. The United Kingdom and 30 other countries also devalued their currencies
relative to the U.S. dollar at the same time as Canada because of postwar difﬁ-
culties in ﬁnancing trade deﬁcits.
aspect of speculation against a pegged exchange rate
was a critical factor in the decision to float in 1950.8
1950: The decision to ﬂoat
Soon after the devaluation of 1949, international
economic conditions changed in favour of Canada’s
8.  Self-fulﬁlling speculative activity against ﬁxed exchange rate regimes was
an important aspect of the exchange rate crises in Europe, Latin America, and
East Asia in the 1990s. See Osakwe and Schembri (1998) for a useful survey.
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Canada had little interest in revaluing, given its limited
success in finding a pegged rate that could sustain
external balance. Canadian ofﬁcials were reluctant to
impose capital controls on the inﬂows or to issue more
debt to sterilize their impact on the domestic money
supply. The IMF was more receptive, however, to the
argument made by Canadian authorities that the
decision to ﬂoat was a temporary move, with a return
to the par value system to take place once a new fun-
damental equilibrium had been reached.9
1950–51: Transition to a market-determined
ﬂexible exchange rate
After the decision to ﬂoat, the Canadian dollar appre-
ciated by 12 per cent, from US$0.909 to US$1.02, over
the next 18 months. This rapid appreciation was caused
by higher commodity prices driven by the U.S. expan-
sion, which generated large and ongoing capital inflows
from the United States—largely foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI)—to develop Canada’s natural resources
(Yeager 1976, 544) (Charts 3 and 4).
This inﬂation experience highlighted
the need for the Bank to obtain
instruments to allow it to conduct
independent and countercyclical
monetary policy under a ﬂexible
exchange rate.
This inflationary pressure posed a serious challenge
to the Bank of Canada’s monetary policy. Under the
Bank of Canada Act, the Bank has a broad mandate
that includes protecting the external value of the
currency and mitigating fluctuations in prices and
economic activity. At the beginning of the floating-
rate period, however, the Bank lacked the instruments,
the experience, and a set of best practices to conduct
effective countercyclical monetary policy under a flexi-
ble exchange rate. In particular, the Bank’s conduct of
monetary policy was hamstrung by the absence of an
active market for short-term government securities
or an interbank market for reserves. The Bank Rate
was themost visibleinstrument of monetary policy, but
9.  In a speech on 20 October 1952, the Minister of Finance, Douglas Abbott,
said, “At some future time conditions may develop [in Canada] in which it
would be appropriate to establish a ﬁxed rate of exchange for the Canadian
dollar.” See Binhammer (1964, 639) and Yeager (1976, 544) for further details.
exports. The terms of trade and capital inflows increased
as a result of rising commodity prices and greater U.S.
investment in the Canadian natural resources sector
(Charts 3 and 4). The demand for these resources
increased because of the economic expansion driven
by the post-World War II recovery and by the expendi-
tures related to the Korean War, which began in June
1950. This balance-of-payments surplus, which was
caused by both higher exports and capital inflows, led
to a significant increase in international reserves, bank
reserves, and the money supply. As is evident in Chart 2,
the accumulation of reserves accelerated as specula-
tors bought Canadian-dollar assets on the expectation
of another adjustment in the exchange rate peg. To
offset this substantial surge in inﬂationary pressure,
the authorities decided to float the Canadian dollar
rather than try to pick another par value, only to find
out, as in 1946 and 1949, that it was no longer consist-
ent with external balance.
To offset this surge in inﬂationary
pressure, the authorities decided to
ﬂoat the Canadian dollar rather than
try to pick another par value, only to
ﬁnd out that it might no longer be
consistent with external balance.
IMF reaction to Canada’s decision
Canada’s decision to float was significant because
ﬂoating meant departing from the normal rules of the
parvalueBrettonWoodssystem,underwhichmembers,
once having declared a par value, could only change it
if circumstances suggested a fundamental disequilib-
rium and only after consultation with the IMF.  Thus,
Canada’s proposal to adopt a ﬂexible rate in 1950 was
perceived as breaking—or at least ﬂouting—the rules
byanimportantIMFmembercountryandwascriticized
by IMF staff as demonstrating a lack of discipline.
They were seriously concerned that other member
countries might follow suit and jeopardize the exist-
ence of the new system, and possibly the IMF, whose
founding goal was exchange rate stability.
As alternative policies to manage the inflationary
pressure of the increasing capital inﬂows, IMF staff
recommended some combination of revaluation, capital
control, and sterilization of the impact of the reserve
increase on the domestic money supply. As noted,7 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2008
its effectiveness in inﬂuencing monetary conditions
was hindered by the fact that the interest rate channel
for the transmission of monetary policy was not well
developed. Consequently, monetary policy was also
conducted through various limited forms of open
market operations involving government securities
and government deposits held by the chartered
banks, and by moral suasion and direct regulation to
inﬂuence the volume of chartered-bank lending. To
help the Bank manage the ongoing inﬂationary pres-
sure, special direct restrictions on consumer and bank
credit were adopted in 1950 and 1951. Despite the
appreciation of the Canadian dollar, which helped to
insulate the Canadian economy from U.S. inﬂation,
the absence of a timely and effective monetary policy
response made it difficult to control domestic infla-
tion. As a result, CPI inﬂation was 6 per cent in 1950
and rose to over 10 per cent in 1951 (Chart 5), much
of it driven by food prices.10, 11 This experience high-
lighted the need for the Bank to obtain instruments to
allow it to conduct independent and countercyclical
monetary policy under a ﬂexible exchange rate.
1952–56: Stability, reform, and growth
The 1952–56 period was the heyday of the 1950s floating-
rate regime. The Canadian dollar traded at a premium
relative to the U.S. dollar (Chart 1), and FDI-driven
capital inﬂows continued (Chart 3). Inﬂation receded,
andwiththeexceptionofthe1953–54recession,growth
remained relatively strong. The conduct of monetary
policy became more effective as financial market
transmission channels were strengthened. Nonethe-
less, the responsiveness of monetary policy, although
improved,remainedsomewhatsluggish,whichlimited
its countercyclical impact. Although exchange rate
adjustment was countercyclical and stabilizing over
this period, its role was constrained by the muted
monetary policy response.
Since the flexible exchange rate was adjusting to manage
the demand for foreign exchange, exchange controls
were no longer needed and were lifted in December
1951.12 Direct restrictions on consumer and bank credit
were removed in 1952 because inﬂationary pressures
10.  Inﬂation is measured year over year from December.
11.  It is interesting that Mexico, which faced inﬂationary pressures coming
from the U.S. expansion that were similar to those experienced by Canada
in the early 1950s, chose to maintain a ﬁxed exchange rate. As a result, it
experienced inﬂation that exceeded 20 per cent, at least double that in
Canada. See Murray, Schembri, and St-Amant (2003) for more details.
12.  Canada was the second country after the United States to remove
exchange and capital controls after WWII.  Indeed, the removal in 1951
restored the situation to what it was before the war. See Powell (2005) for
further details.
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had subsided. This deregulation and liberalization
created a favourable environment for the develop-
ment of financial markets. The Bank of Canada took
several important steps in 1953 to encourage the
development of a broad and active market in treasury
bills, which included shifting from a biweekly to a
weekly auction and entering into purchase and resale
agreements with dealers of government securities.
This latter innovation spurred the establishment of a
day-to-day loan market among the bank and invest-
ment dealers as banks became more interested in
managing their reserves and the investment dealers
were able to use the purchase and resale agreements
to obtain cash from the Bank of Canada. Thus, the
adoption of a flexible exchange rate in 1950 contributed
toﬁnancialmarketdevelopmentthatstrengthenedthe
Bank’s ability to conduct more effective monetary
policy by establishing a clearer interest rate channel
for the transmission of monetary policy.13
At the end of the Korean War in 1953, defence expen-
ditures fell on both sides of the border, and the Canadian
andU.S.economieswentintoashortbutsharprecession
(Chart 6). Inflation in Canada fell below zero. Since
market interest rates also remained relatively low,
the Bank Rate was reduced to 1.5 per cent in February
1955 because the Bank felt that this rate should be more
“ﬂexible and bear a closer (though not ﬁxed) relation
to other short-term interest rates” (Bank of Canada
1956, 7). Indeed, this change marked the beginning of
more frequent use of the Bank Rate as an instrument
of monetary policy.14
The Canadian economy grew strongly—and faster
than the U.S. economy—through the rest of 1955,
1956, and into 1957 (Chart 6). Investment boomed in
both countries, and in Canada was centred on the
development of natural resources. The new invest-
ment required higher imports, which were ﬁnanced
by large inflows of foreign direct investment. As
aggregate demand grew, inflation pressures began
to mount and, for the ﬁrst time in the ﬂoating-rate
period, the inflationary pressure was domestic in
origin. Although inflation was almost zero in 1955,
it jumped to 3 per cent in 1956 (Chart 5).
13.  Bordo, Dib, and Schembri (2007) ﬁnd that a monetary policy response
function with the short-term interest rate as the policy instrument, and low
inﬂation and output and exchange rate stability as the targets, performs rea-
sonably well in empirically representing the Bank’s conduct of monetary
policy over the ﬂoating-rate period. Nonetheless, the goals of monetary
policy were not as clearly articulated as they are today; without an explicit
numerical inﬂation target, inﬂationary expectations were not as well
anchored.
14.  The Bank Rate was eventually set at 25 basis points above the 3-month
treasury bill tender rate.
In summary,over the 1952–56period, monetarypolicy
became more effective in controlling inflation and
stabilizing economic activity; its countercyclical respon-
siveness, however, remained below modern standards.
Although constrained by sluggish monetary policy,
the exchange rate adjusted in a countercyclical fashion
(see Charts 1 and 6, primarily in 1953–54 and 1956).
Although the economy continued to grow from 1956
into 1957, higher interest rates and a stronger dollar
(which had appreciated by almost 7 per cent over 1955
and 1956 to a premium of US$0.04 by the end of 1956)
were starting to have an impact.
1957–60: Deteriorating economic
performance
In 1957, after more than two years of strong growth,
the economy began to experience a slowdown marked
by a sharp increase in the unemployment rate (from
3 per cent to 8 per cent, Chart 7). Observers began to
question the wisdom of Canadian monetary policy,
especially since the Bank continued to tighten monetary
conditions until August 1957, as shown in Charts 8
and 9, with the Bank Rate rising to 4.33 per cent and
the Canadian dollar appreciating to a peak of US$1.06
at the same time. This further tightening seemed
unwarranted, since the signs of a slowdown were
apparent—the inﬂation rate started to decline early in
1957 and by the end of the year was at 2.2 per cent,
down from 3 per cent in 1956. Criticisms of monetary
policy were based on the observation that the Canadian
economic downturn was more pronounced than the
U.S. economic slowdown. This difference was interpreted
Chart 6
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as indicating that the source of the adverse shock was
not foreign, but domestic (i.e., tight monetary policy).
In contrast, it could be argued that monetary policy
over the years 1955 and 1956 had allowed growth to
increasetooquickly,therebycausingexcessdemand and
higher inﬂation, and thus monetary policy actions in
1957 and 1958 had to be aggressive to reduce inflation.
The truth likely lies somewhere in between: that is,
monetary policy was insufﬁciently countercyclical
over both the expansionary and contractionary phases
of the 1954–58 business cycle.
The trough in the recession in both countries was
reached in the spring of 1958, and large-scale monetary
expansions helped both economies to recover quickly;
interest rates in Canada fell as the Bank Rate declined
from 3.92 per cent at the end of 1957 to a low of 1.91 per
cent in July of 1958 (Chart 9).  These monetary expan-
sions also facilitated the conversion, or roll over into
longer maturities, of government bonds, which had
been issued to ﬁnance WWII defence expenditures.
As both economies rebounded in the second half of
1958, interest rates rose sharply to levels that had
prevailed at the beginning of the year (Charts 9 and
10). In Canada, the increase was larger, in part because
the federal and provincial governments were running
expansionary ﬁscal policies to combat the high unem-
ployment. Critics of the Bank of Canada nevertheless
blamed the higher rates on monetary policy that was
too tight. Since neither the Bank nor its critics (e.g.,
Gordon 1961) had the beneﬁt of Mundell’s later work,
neither side fully appreciated that, under a ﬂoating
rate, expansionary fiscal policy also contributed to
higher interest rates and a stronger Canadian dollar.
The currency appreciated by roughly 2 per cent in
1958 and remained at a premium to the U.S. dollar
into 1959.
Inﬂation fell from 2.5 per cent in 1958 to 2.0 per cent in
1959, and the recovery continued in Canada through
to the end of 1959. As the Bank continued to push up
short-term interest rates over the first eight months
of 1959 (the Bank Rate increased by 257 basis points,
from3.85 percentto 6.42per centoverthis shortperiod),
a signiﬁcant spread developed between Canadian and
U.S. interest rates (Charts 9 and 10), and the dollar
appreciated by a further 1 per cent. The Federal Reserve
also feared higher future inflation in 1959, and 1960,
and it too increased its discount rate, but less dramati-
cally than did the Bank of Canada. The impact of this
tightening was felt in 1960 as both economies grew more
slowly and inﬂation fell to 1.3 per cent in Canada. The
unemployment rate in Canada increased sharply,
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cent by the end of the year. In this instance, the Bank
did not seem to recognize that higher interest rates
attracted capital inflows and caused the Canadian dollar
to appreciate, thereby further tightening domestic
monetary conditions.
The impact and effectiveness of
monetary and ﬁscal policies under a
ﬂoating exchange rate and a high
degree of capital mobility were not
well understood.
The political pressure from the rising unemployment
rate, together with other differences between Governor
Coyne and the Diefenbaker government, prompted
thegovernment to introduce legislation in May 1961
to declare the position of the Governor of the Bank
of Canada vacant. After the government’s bill was
defeated in the Senate, Governor Coyne resigned.15
In summary, the Bank of Canada’s monetary policy
over the years 1957–61 was not sufﬁciently countercy-
15.  Powell (forthcoming) provides an insightful analysis of the events
surrounding the resignation of Governor Coyne.
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clical during periods of slower growth and rising unem-
ployment, while fiscal policy during these episodes
was typically expansionary. The impact and effective-
ness of monetary and ﬁscal policies under a ﬂoating
exchange rate and a high degree of capital mobility
were not well understood. The combination of con-
tractionary monetary policy and expansionary ﬁscal
policy both worked in the direction of raising interest
rates and pushing up the external value of the currency.
Their effect on output was at best offsetting and, at
worst, exacerbated the weak growth.
1961–62: The awkward transition to a
pegged exchange rate
After the resignation of James Coyne, Louis Rasminsky
was appointed Governor. Rasminsky’s acceptance of
the position was conditional on a clarification of the
responsibility for monetary policy between the central
bank and the government. Drafted by Rasminsky,
the directive power, as it is known, states that should a
conflict occur between the Bank and the government
over the conduct of monetary policy, the government
would be required to issue a specific directive to the
Governor that would be published in the Canada
Gazette (the government’s official record). Under
these circumstances, the Governor would likely
resign.
Rasminsky’s accomplishment with the directive power
was overshadowed in his ﬁrst year of ofﬁce, however,
by the government’s clumsy attempts to reﬂate the
economy by talking down the dollar, which eventually
brought about an exchange rate crisis that required
IMF intervention. In response to the relatively high
unemployment rate, the government’s 1961 budget
promised a host of expansionary fiscal policy measures.
The government also expressed a desire to see the
dollar depreciate and, to that end, began to sell
Canadian dollars in the foreign exchange market. The
dollar soon declined, from a premium of approxi-
mately 1 per cent on the U.S. dollar in July 1961 to a
5 per cent discount by September. Further official
downward pressure sparked a speculative attack on
the dollar in April 1962, and, to stem the free fall, the
government announced a devalued peg at US$0.925
cents. In June 1962, a rescue package of slightly more
than US$1 billion supplied by the IMF, the United
States, and the United Kingdom was required to
restore stability. This announcement temporarily
interrupted Canada’s postwar experiment with a ﬂoat-
ing exchange rate.11 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2008
The Floating Canadian Dollar: Its
Stable Behaviour and Stabilizing
Role
This section focuses on two issues: the remarkable
stability of the Canadian dollar over the 1950–62 float-
ing-rate period, and the related issue of whether this
relatively stable exchange rate actually helped to
insulate the Canadian economy from external shocks.
Over the full 12-year period, the dollar ﬂuctuated in a
narrow range of 13 cents (US), from a low of US$0.93
in early 1951 to a peak of US$1.06 in August 1957.
Over the core period, 1952–60, the range was much
smaller, only 6 cents (US), from US$1.00 in early 1952
to US$1.06 in August 1957. Moreover, high-frequency
fluctuations were very mild and orderly. Over the
whole period, the average day-to-day change was
0.08 per cent, and only 5 per cent of the daily changes
over the ﬂoating-rate period exceeded one quarter of a
per cent (Poole 1967).
Several explanations have been put forward to rationalize
the dollar’s stability. Many attributed it to stabilizing
speculation by agents who believed that movements
in the rate were temporary (Poole 1967; Marsh 1969;
Yeager 1976). This evidence was perceived as being
consistent with the original assertion by Friedman
(1953) that speculation under a ﬂoating exchange rate
would necessarily be stabilizing in order to be profitable.
Others attributed it to the coincidence of Canadian
and U.S. cyclical positions and monetary policies
(Hawkins 1968, 31) (Charts 6, 8, and 9).
It has also been argued that ofﬁcial intervention oper-
ations served to stabilize the value of the Canadian
dollar, but the literature has concluded that official
intervention did not play a significant role in stabilizing
the nominal exchange rate. Although intervention was
frequent over the 1952–60 period, the scale of inter-
vention was limited and simply offset short-run fluctua-
tions to maintain an orderly foreign exchange
market (Plumptre 1970, 4).16
Several observers, including Plumptre (1970, 6), argue
that the relative stability of the floating Canadian
dollar was due, in part, to the absence of large shocks
during this period.17 Bordo, Dib, and Schembri (2007)
ﬁnd evidence consistent with this argument. They use
16. Net monthly changes in ofﬁcial reserves were less than 20 million dollars
in the majority of months when intervention occurred (Wonnacott 1965;
Yeager 1976; Canada 1964; Binhammer 1964).
17.   Plumptre (1970) also notes that when the Canadian dollar ﬂoated in the
1930s, its movements were relatively stable as well.
their estimated model of the Canadian economy to
extract structural shocks for the postwar decades and
ﬁnd that the volatilities of the shocks during the 1950s
were generally lower than those experienced during
the other ﬂexible-rate decades (the 1970s, 1980s, and
1990s).
The Canadian dollar was relatively stable over this
period, not only because shocks were comparatively
small and to some degree common to both the Cana-
dian and U.S. economies, as shown by the close cor-
relation of their business cycles, but also because capital
was relatively immobile globally (capital ﬂows
between Canada and the United States were the glaring
exceptions). In addition, it is important to recognize
that Canada was the only major industrialized country
floating its currency at that time—all other major coun-
tries had rates pegged to the U.S. dollar.
In addition to giving the domestic authorities control
over monetary policy, the other main benefit of a floating
rate is its ability to shelter the domestic economy from
external shocks. As noted earlier, the Canadian floating
rate was very stable, especially when compared to the
experience of the industrialized countries since the
collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early
1970s, and this was despite two sizable recessions.
This stability has led some observers (Wonnacott 1965;
McLeod 1965) to conclude that Canada’s experience in
the 1950s did not provide overwhelming evidence on
the postulated insulation properties of a ﬂoating rate.
Unfortunately, the qualitative bivariate comparison
conducted by these authors is incomplete and does
not provide an adequate counterfactual analysis. In
particular, it is likely that exchange rate adjustment to
movements in U.S. export demand was hindered by
weakly countercyclical monetary policy. Mundell
(1964), McLeod (1965), and Dunn (1971) argue that
Canadian monetary policy was less countercyclical
than U.S. monetary policy in the two coincident
recessions of1953–54 and 1957–58 (Charts 6, 8, and 9).
Consequently, the Canadian dollar tended to appreciate
when the U.S. authorities eased monetary policy earlier
and more aggressively than did their Canadian coun-
terparts, and therefore, the exchange rate appeared
not to provide much insulation for the Canadian econ-
omy when U.S. demand declined.
The impact of this higher interest rate differential was
felt by the Canadian dollar. Because there was a signif-
icant degree of capital mobility between Canada and
the United States, there is much evidence that the
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interest rate differential in the 1950s.18 Thus, the tighter
Canadian monetary policy in the second half of the
ﬂoating-rate period held the Canadian dollar above
parity with the U.S. dollar, thereby reducing the domestic
and world demand for Canadian-produced traded
goods and slowing economic activity.
Bordo, Dib, and Schembri (2007) conducted two coun-
terfactual experiments with a well-speciﬁed model of
the Canadian economy to examine the economic
impact of its monetary and exchange rate policies in
the 1950s. The ﬁrst involves eliminating the apparent
shift in monetary policy that took place over the second
half of the sample by maintaining the estimated mon-
etary policy response function that prevailed over
1950–56,throughoutthefloating-rateperiod.Thesecond
experiment consists of assuming that the fixed exchange
rate parity of 1950 is not abandoned in favour of a
ﬂexible exchange rate.
The results of the first counterfactual experiment
suggest that, had monetary policy not changed during
the second half of the floating-rate period, the Canadian
economy would have performed better. The policy
actually followed was not only more volatile, but also
produced higher interest rates. Consequently, output
was less stable, and growth was likely slower because
higher interest rates also generated a more appreciated
exchange rate. This misunderstanding of the impact of
monetary policy under a ﬂoating rate contributed to
the demise of this regime.
These counterfactual experiments
indicate that output and inﬂation
were more stable under a ﬂexible
exchange rate than they would have
been under a ﬁxed one.
Under the second counterfactual experiment of a ﬁxed
nominal exchange rate, the volatilities of all the variables
(except the exchange rate) increase dramatically. The
results suggest that the ﬂexible exchange rate regime
was successful in stabilizing the Canadian economy,
even during the post-1957 period when monetary
policy was more volatile.
18.  See, for example, Caves et al. (1971).
As noted earlier, the Canadian ﬂoating rate was unex-
pectedly stable in the 1950s, which begs the question
as to how much of a role it played if it varied so lit-
tle. Although there are several possible explanations for
this stability, an important one is that monetary policy
was not conducted to take full advantage of the ﬂexible
rate’s ability to facilitate macroeconomic adjustment.
Nonetheless, these counterfactual experiments indi-
cate that output and inﬂation were more stable under
a ﬂexible exchange rate than they would have been
under a ﬁxed one.
Impact on Economic Thought
AlthoughCanada’sdecisiontoadoptaflexibleexchange
rate was initially opposed by the IMF, the successes
and difficulties encountered by the Canadian authorities
in managing monetary and fiscal policy under this
regime drew the interest of researchers at the IMF and
elsewhere. Canada’s experience had a significant
impact on the development of the Mundell–Fleming
model, and in particular, on Mundell’s contribution.
This model became the workhorse of the IMF for three
decades and was a fundamental building block of the
new ﬁeld of open-economy macroeconomics.
The Canadian ﬂexible exchange rate experience
inspired the research of Robert Mundell. Mundell
spent a year (1961–62) in the Research and Statistics
Department at the IMF, and his work complemented
and inﬂuenced that of two IMF researchers, J. Marcus
Fleming and Rudolf Rhomberg.
In two recent retrospectives, Mundell discusses the
inﬂuence of the Canadian experience on the develop-
ment of his part of the Mundell-Fleming model:
It was around this time [1956–57] that I
shifted researchtopicsfromwritingaboutand
further refining the pure classical model to
thinking about the way to write down the
general equilibrium equations for an open
economy taking into account monetary varia-
bles,exchangerates,andcapitalmovements.
The fact that Canada had a ﬂexible exchange
rate and capital ﬂows between Canada and
theUnitedStatesweresignificantbackground
inﬂuences but there was absolutely no
model in the literature that was capable of
dealing with the subject. (Mundell 2002, 4)
In describing the implications of the version of the
model in his 1960 article for the Quarterly Journal of
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One implication of the model was that a
domestic boom would raise interest rates,
attract capital inﬂows, appreciate the real
exchange rate, and worsen the balance of
trade, . . . a conclusion that would hold
under either ﬁxed or ﬂexible exchange rates.
This was very relevant to an understanding
of the economy of Canada, which was the
only major country with a ﬂexible exchange
rate in the 1950s. (Mundell 2001, 221)
Rudiger Dornbusch (2000, 200) and Andrew Rose
(2000, 217), in their articles describing Mundell’s
Nobel achievements, emphasize that Canada’s experi-
ence inspired his work. Mundell wrote several key
papers in the early 1960s (in particular, Mundell 1961
and 1963) that dealt directly with the Canadian experi-
ence with ﬂoating and capital mobility. Mundell
(1963), the most well known, carefully compares the
use of monetary and fiscal policy under fixed and
flexible exchange rates and capital mobility. His
demonstration that, under floating rates, an increase in
government expenditure puts upward pressure on the
interest and exchange rates and limits the impact of the
ﬁscal expansion on output accurately captures the
Canadian experience of the late 1950s and early 1960s.
A contractionary monetary policy also puts upward
pressure on the interest rate and the exchange rate and
causes output to fall. Once again, this analysis is a
good representation of the Canadian experience in the
late 1950s. In particular, Mundell (1964) argues that
Governor Coyne’s policy of tight money in response to
his concerns about expected inflation and large capi-
tal inflows from the United States backfired. The
rise in interest rates attracted additional capital
inﬂows, appreciated the Canadiandollar,anddepressed
both domestic investment and the demand for exports.
Moreover, the government’s fiscal expansion in
response to the deteriorating economic conditions had
little effect because it served to raise interest rates and
the exchange rate further.
J. Marcus Fleming was in the Research and Statistics
Department at the IMF from 1954 to 1976. His contri-
bution to the development of the Mundell-Fleming
model was similar to (though less proliﬁc than) that
of Mundell, and he is viewed as an equal contributor
(Boughton 2003). In his 1962 paper, Fleming obtains
results similar to Mundell’s using a ﬁxed-price IS-LM
model with the addition of endogenous current and
capital accounts. Like Mundell, he shows that fiscal pol-
icy is more effective than monetary policy under a
ﬁxed rate, while the opposite prevails under a ﬂoating
rate.
Rudolf Rhomberg joined the IMF Research and Statistics
Department in 1959 after completing his PhD thesis at
Yale on the Canadian experience with floating rates.
In his first paper, Rhomberg (1960) models the short-
run balance-of-payments adjustment process in an
open economy and uses it to examine the determinants
of the remarkable stability of the Canadian floating
exchange rate regime.  He finds that speculative
movements were, on the whole, equilibrating and the
main cause of exchange rate stability. He noted,
however, that the ﬂoating rate did not automatically
insulate Canada from external shocks because it had
not been fully incorporated into Canadian monetary
policy. Nonetheless, the floating rate was more effective
in combating inﬂation than it was against recessionary
pressures. Rhomberg’s work also refuted earlier
propositions that the flexible exchange rate would
be unstable unless strict capital controls were in place.
He pointed out that the earlier theory was incorrect
because it put too much weight on large short-term
capital movements driven by signiﬁcant changes in
expectations and concluded that the Canadian experi-
ence had shown that a ﬂexible exchange rate is not
inherently fragile.
The Canadian experience helped to
demonstrate that ﬂexible exchange
rates were a viable alternative to the
Bretton Woods system.
In his second influential paper, Rhomberg (1964)
estimates a small macroeconometric model of the
Canadian economy and obtains results that support
the Mundell-Fleming ﬁnding that monetary policy is
most effective under ﬂexible rates, while ﬁscal policy
is most effective under ﬁxed rates. He also ﬁnds that,
under ﬂoating rates, the domestic real economy is well
insulated from foreign output shocks.
The research of Mundell, Fleming, and Rhomberg was
inspired by the Canadian experience with a flexible
exchange rate and the challenges Canada faced in con-
ducting monetary and fiscal policy in this environment.
Althoughtheirworkwasperhapsthemostinﬂuential,
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useful lessons from the Canadian experience. In
particular, it helped to demonstrate that flexible
exchange rates were a viable alternative to the Bretton
Woods system, and the relative success of the subse-
quent system of generalized ﬂoating has conﬁrmed
this prediction. Moreover, central banks in many
countries now benefit from the monetary policy
independence that ﬂexible exchange rates provide by
adopting a policy that targets a measure of national
inﬂation. In so doing, they have been able to achieve
large gains in overall macroeconomic stability, partly
through the achievement of low and stable inﬂation,
but also by incorporating the exchange rate channel in
their monetary policy process and by allowing the
exchange rate to play a stabilizing role.
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